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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
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+--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
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++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
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+@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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++/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
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++#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
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++
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+ /*
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+ * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
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+ */
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+@@ -407,21 +410,57 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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+ }
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+
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+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
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++ size_t key_len;
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++
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+ /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
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+ if (vlen < 5)
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+ return -EBADMSG;
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+- if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)) ||
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+- v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
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+- v[2] != (ASN1_CONT << 6) ||
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+- v[3] != vlen - 4)
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++
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++ /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
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++ if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)))
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+ return -EBADMSG;
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+- v += 4;
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+- vlen -= 4;
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+
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+- f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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++ /* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */
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++ if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH))
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++ return -EBADMSG;
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++
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++ if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
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++ /* Short Form length */
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++ if (v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
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++ v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
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++ v[3] > vlen - 4)
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++ return -EBADMSG;
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++
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++ key_len = v[3];
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++ v += 4;
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++ } else {
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++ /* Long Form length */
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++ size_t seq_len = 0;
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++ size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
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++
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++ if (sub > 2)
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++ return -EBADMSG;
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++
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++ /* calculate the length from subsequent octets */
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++ v += 2;
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++ for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) {
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++ seq_len <<= 8;
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++ seq_len |= v[i];
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++ }
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++
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++ if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub ||
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++ v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
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++ v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
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++ return -EBADMSG;
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++
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++ key_len = v[sub + 1];
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++ v += (sub + 2);
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++ }
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++
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++ f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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+ if (!f)
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+ return -ENOMEM;
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+- for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
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++ for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
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+ sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
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+ pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
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+ ctx->cert->authority = f;
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Maxim Kammerer